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INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1980s the metaphor of the market guided the
decisions of the Federal Communications Commission. Then-Chair-
man Mark Fowler declared that television was simply a "toaster
with pictures" and adopted the position that the same market
mechanisms which work in the market for private goods (such as
toasters) would also work in the broader information marketplace
of television broadcasting.' To those who bemoaned the lack of
public affairs or educational programming, he pointed out that
viewer preferences determined programming outcomes and that
any lack of programming stemmed from a lack of demand. As he
put it: "The public's interest, then, defines the public interest."2
The current FCC Chairman, Reed Hundt, now proposes a
clear departure from the regulatory bargain of the 1980s. Chair-
man Hundt's article outlines a much different vision of the televi-
sion marketplace and consequently a different definition of
broadcasters' property rights.? Chairman Hundt suggests that the
broadcast license should be an explicit contract between the gov-
ernment and a broadcast television station incorporating clearly
enunciated standards with which the FCC will determine license
renewal.' Accordingly, stations will not be able to satisfy the
terms of their licenses simply by responding to market forces. Fur-
t Director, Duke Program on Violence and the Media, and Assistant Professor of
Public Policy, Economics, and Political Science, Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke
University.
1. Bernard D. Nossiter, The FCC's Big Giveaway Show, THE NATION, Oct. 26,
1985, at 402.
2. Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 207, 210 (1982).
3. Reed E. Hundt, The Public's Airwaves: What Does the Public Interest Require of
Television Broadcasters?, 45 DUKE 1,. 1089 (1996).
4. Id. at 1096.
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thermore, the Chairman urges, if broadcasters do not voluntarily
label violent programming, Congress should pass legislation that
channels such violent programming to safe harbor hours when
children are less likely to be in the viewing audience.' Broadcast-
ers would have the option of showing violent programs in times
outside the safe harbor only if they rate these programs so that
they can be blocked by a television component capable of screen-
ing rated programs.
The reversal of the FCC's laissez-faire approach to broadcast-
ers could be caricatured as a resurgence of progressive paternal-
ism, in which government regulators attempt to influence people
to watch more programs approved by the FCC. The notion of an
active FCC specifying additional limits on programming may also
suggest a return to command and control regulation, at a time
when Congress is deregulating many other communications chan-
nels. This Comment argues, however, that attempts to influence
the amount of educational programming for children, public affairs
coverage, and indecent or violent programming are all aimed at
remedying, rather than creating, market failures. Part I demon-
strates how, in each of these areas, the pursuit by individuals of
their private interests leads to outcomes less than optimal to the
interests of society as a whole (as defined by the economist's
standard of efficiency). Part II asserts that social science theory
and evidence in each of these areas indicate the direction for
improvement but cannot quantify the exact magnitude of the
harm, thereby affording no guarantee that all government actions
aimed at correcting these market failures will actually improve
outcomes. However, Part III proposes that using the provision of
information as a regulatory tool in this area holds out the prospect
of better programming outcomes with fewer dangers of overregula-
tion. The Comment concludes by arguing that theory and evidence
indicate the potential for one particular mechanism for the provi-
sion of information, the V-chip, to alleviate some of the problems
inherent in the current definition of property rights in broadcast-
ing.
5. Id. at 1120. On Feb. 29, 1996, broadcasters and cable networks did announce a
plan to rate their programs voluntarily. See Alison Mitchell, TV Executives Promise
Clinton a Violence Ratings System by '97, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1996, at Al.
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I. A PROBLEM OF MASS APPEAL OR MARKET FAILURE?
Broadcast television stations, by the terms of their licenses,
are supposed to broadcast in the "public interest, convenience, and
necessity.",6 Chairman Hundt notes that Congress has specifically
taken action in four areas to provide guidance on how this broad
requirement should be interpreted: educational programming for
children; public affairs programming (specifically political campaign
ads); indecent programming; and violent programming.7 There are,
however, those who object to the imposition on broadcasters of
strict regulations even in these areas. In the case of children's
programming or public affairs coverage, a standard reply to com-
plaints about an insufficient quantity of such programming is that
these topics lack mass appeal. In the case of indecent or violent
programming, on the other hand, the argument is made that these
remain popular programs because they do have mass appeal. Com-
plaints about the quality or quantity of shows in these fields are
often criticized as arguments with the tastes of the viewing public.
Debates over program content should start with an analysis of
the economics of the television market. Each of these program-
ming areas is characterized by a particular type of market failure
involving the presence of externalities, which are costs or benefits
to society that may not be reflected in the decisions of individu-
als.8 Economists formally define externalities as existing when two
conditions are met:
Condition 1: An externality is present whenever some individual's
(say A's) utility or production relationships include real (that is,
nonmonetary) variables, whose values are chosen by others (per-
sons, corporations, governments) without particular attention to
the effects on A's welfare....
6. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1988).
7. See Hundt, supra note 3, at 1089-90.
8. Bruce Owen and Steven Wildman detail many of the problems (from a social
welfare perspective) associated with television markets, although they do not focus on the
externality arguments advanced here. See BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN,
VIDEO ECONOMICS (1992). Summarizing the results of models of broadcast and cable
competition, they conclude that "[r]elative to the viewer benefits provided, both advertis-
er-supported television and pay television have three biases: against programs that cater
to minority-interest tastes, against expensive programs, and in favor of programs that
produce large audiences." Id. at 148.
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Condition 2: The decisionmaker, whose activity affects others'
utility levels or enters their production functions, does not re-
ceive (pay) in compensation for this activity an amount equal in
value to the resulting benefits (or costs) to others.9
Educational programming for children and public affairs coverage
provide positive externalities, which generally means that such
programming will be underprovided in comparison to a market-
place where their full benefits were reflected in the decisions of
private actors. Indecent and violent shows generate negative
externalities, which means they will generally be overprovided in
comparison to a property rights regime under which the social
costs of these shows were incorporated in programming and view-
ing decisions.10 Consider the logic behind the viewing and broad-
casting decisions in each of these areas.
A. Educational Programming For Children
Parents concerned about the educational development of their
children may seek out educational shows for their children to
watch. These parents trade off the costs of guiding children to
educational programs (which include the time involved in learning
which shows are educational) with the private benefits their chil-
dren may gain from lessons learned by viewing. An additional set
of benefits from a child's education, such as the increased proba-
bility that the child will become a productive citizen, accrue to
society at large. However, parents do not fully internalize these
benefits to society in their decisionmaking about how much to
invest in guiding their children to educational programming. Thus,
there will be fewer children in the audience for these shows than
if all the benefits of these programs were reflected in parental
9. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLCY 17-18 (1988).
10. Print coverage also generates positive and negative externalities, which raises the
question of why broadcasters' externalities may be viewed differently from those of print
media. Indecent and violent programming may be more accessible to young children than
similar print material, thus drawing more attention to the issue of shielding children from
such broadcast programming. Discussion of the positive externalities generated by educa-
tional children's programming or broadcast coverage of public affairs often occurs in
debates over the "price" broadcasters should pay for their use of the spectrum. See, e.g.,
Edmund L. Andrews, Digital TV, Dollars and Dissent: The Political Battle Grows Over
the Use of New Broadcast Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1996, at Dl. If the spectrum
were auctioned, broadcasters would likely face lower (or no) expectations in terms of
public interest programming.
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decisionmaking. Fewer children means less interest on the part of
advertisers or cable operators, resulting in reduced incentives for
broadcasters or cable operators to offer educational programs
relative to incentives to offer entertainment programming for chil-
dren. This does not mean that broadcasters or cable operators will
fail to offer any educational programming for children. It simply
means that the incentives they face in the marketplace will lead
them to offer, from society's point of view, a less-than-optimal
amount of educational programming.
B. Public Affairs Coverage
In the context of public affairs, Anthony Downs' theory of
"rational ignorance" helps to explain the less-than-optimal levels of
demand for and provision of informational programming. Downs
developed the concept of rational ignorance to describe the levels
of information most citizens have about the details of most policy
issues." According to the theory, the same logic of free riding
which discourages voter turnout operates in the market for public
affairs coverage. Downs emphasized that the markets for business,
consumer, and entertainment information work relatively well be-
cause individuals cannot enjoy the benefits of these types of infor-
mation without consuming the information themselves. 2 Yet
when it comes to the market for information that allows people to
function as citizens, the small likelihood that an individual's politi-
cal action will have any significant impact leads to individual in-
centives that discourage people from expressing a strong demand
for information that might aid their voting decisions. 3
Downs demonstrated that a voter, when deciding how much
information about the details of policy he will demand, is trading
off the benefits and costs of becoming informed. 4 There may be
11. In describing the incentives individuals have to learn about public policy, Downs
concluded that "[i]n general, it is irrational to be politically well-informed because the
low returns from data simply do not justify their cost in time and other scarce resourc-
es." ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 259 (1957). Political
scientists now refer to this as the "rational ignorance" hypothesis. For a debate over the
validity of this claim, see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIO-
NAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 94-97
(1994).
12. See DOWNS, supra note 11, at 215.
13. Id. at 253-55.
14. Id. at 208-19.
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a large difference for a voter between the positions of Candidate
A versus Candidate B, and there may even be a high probability
that additional information would help the voter make the correct
voting decision (from the voter's perspective) between the candi-
dates. In most elections, however, the probability that one's vote
will be decisive is minuscule. The costs of becoming informed,
however, are not negligible, because they involve the opportunity
cost of time involved in viewing and the additional costs of charg-
es that may be imposed to obtain such viewing material. The net
benefits of becoming informed about the details of policies, de-
fined as: (Benefit of Candidate A versus Candidate B) x (Increase
in probability that voter makes the correct decision) x (Probability
vote is decisive) - (Costs of becoming informed), is negative for
nearly all individuals.'" Thus, individuals "rationally" choose to
remain ignorant of the details of policy, which translates into low-
er incentives for broadcast and cable coverage of these issues. On
the other hand, if broadcasters were led to internalize the gains to
voters from becoming informed about policies, then coverage of
the details of policies would increase.
Despite Downs' predictions about political participation, some
people do vote and some people do watch public affairs program-
ming. For some individuals, the ideological satisfaction of "doing
the right thing" may lead them to the voting booth. To the extent
that such individuals feel a duty to become informed about their
vote, there will also be an expressed demand for public affairs
reporting. Moreover, the human elements and sporting nature of
politics lead many people to view political news as entertainment.
This means that the private market for entertainment will provide
coverage of politics as human drama (thus the prevalence of char-
acter issues) or as a horse race (thus the preoccupation with
"who's ahead"). 6 However, voters are likely to choose to remain
rationally ignorant about the details of many policies even as they
express a demand for politics as theater and sport. Thus, the
amount of detailed public affairs programming is likely to stay
below the socially optimal level.
15. Id. at 240-59.
16. For an introduction to recent research on political coverage, see STEPHEN ANSO-
LABEHERE ET AL, THE MEDIA GAME: AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE TELEVISION AGE
(1993).
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C. Indecent or Violent Programming
Both indecent and violent television programs may involve
negative externalities if they are viewed by children. Because the
logic behind the production and viewing of such programs is simi-
lar in some ways, this section will focus on violent programming.
The social science literature suggests that viewing violent television
programs may lead some children in the short run to behave more
aggressively and in the long run to behave more violently. 7 How-
ever, the social costs from crime and aggression engendered by
television are not reflected in the programming calculus of broad-
casters or advertisers. Instead, a broadcaster considering whether
to air a violent program will calculate the number of likely viewers
and multiply this figure by the advertising revenues realized by
marketing these viewers to advertisers. In simplified terms, profits
from the program are: (Advertising rate per thousand viewers x
Number of thousands of viewers) - (Production costs of the pro-
gram), and broadcasters will choose to air programs that maximize
these profits. On the other hand, if broadcasters factored in the
expected costs of violence to society in their programming deci-
sions, returns on these shows would be lowered and their produc-
tion made less likely. 8
If violence on television does generate violence in society, why
not rely on parents to monitor their children's consumption? Here
again the calculus by individuals of their private interests leads to
social outcomes that are not fully optimal. Parents will consider
the benefits to their children's development that may result from
shielding them from violent programming, but they likely will not
consider the additional benefits to society-lower expected overall
crime and punishment costs-that would also arise. The costs of
monitoring consumption can be high; parents must search out
information on program content and then monitor television use
17. See GEORGE COMSTOCK WITH HAEJUNG PAIK, TELEVISION AND THE AMERICAN
CHILD 236-39 (1991); JAMES T. HAMILTON, COMMISSION ON RADIO AND TELEVISION
POLICY, VIOLENCE AND THE MEDIA: RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY IMPLICA-
TIONS 3-13 (1994); MATrHEW L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STO-
RIES 95-118 (1986); Barrie Gunter, The Question of Media Violence, in MEDIA EFFECTS:
ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 163 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillman eds.,
1994).
18. Formal models of the economics of violent programming and tests of these mod-
els can be found in James T. Hamilton, Channeling Violence: The Economic Market for
Violent Television Programming (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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by children. Faced with these incentives, even parents who believe
that violent programming is damaging to their children will engage
in less than the ideal amount of television monitoring.
In each of these areas, individuals following their own private
viewing or broadcasting interests generally will fail to incorporate
all the benefits and costs to society in their decisions. Thus, the
pursuit of private interests leads to inefficient outcomes, which are
often characterized as failures of the "public interest."19
II. THE DIRECTIONS, BuT NOT THE DETAILS, OF POLICY ARE
CLEAR
Economic theory indicates that educational programming for
children, public affairs coverage, and indecent and violent pro-
gramming all exhibit market failures. Because of these failures, the
programs that generate positive externalities are underprovided
while those generating negative externalities are overprovided.
Social science research to date cannot determine the exact magni-
tudes of the market failures.' Nonetheless, the inability to quan-
tify the precise measure of adjustment needed should not deter
government officials from taking some corrective action in these
areas.
For example, if broadcasters are required, in exchange for
spectrum use, to show more programs that generate positive
externalities, viewers will still not watch them in amounts that are
optimal from society's perspective. However, more program offer-
ings should draw more viewers to these types of programming, and
thus would at least bring viewership closer to socially optimal
levels. Moreover, if fees from a spectrum auction were designated
for programming in these areas (through a fund for public broad-
19. The term "public interest" is placed in quotations in parts of this Comment
because it has a specific definition in economic discourse: a social welfare function that
aggregates individual preferences into a social decision that satisfies a set of conditions
about rationality and fairness. Ken Arrow established that such a function does not exist,
so that in this sense the "public interest" does not exist. See DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 38-42
(1991). When terms such as "optimal" and "ideal" are used in this Comment, the judg-
ment of broadcasting outcomes is based on the criteria of economic efficiency.
20. For a review of literature focusing on the magnitude of the impact of violence
programming, see generally GEORGE COMSTOCK & HAEJUNG PAIK, NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, THE EFFECTS OF TELEVISION VIOLENCE ON AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR:
A META-ANALYSIS (1990) (preliminary report for the Panel on the Understanding and
Control of Violent Behavior).
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casting) then viewership might rise; audiences likely would be
more attracted to such programs if the resources devoted to them
were higher.2'
There is also compelling social science evidence suggesting
that some efforts to reduce viewership by children of programs
generating negative externalities may be appropriate. Social science
research demonstrates that violent television programming leads to
short-term increases in aggression in children and may lead to
increases in fear, increased desensitization toward violent acts, and
ultimately to longer-term increases in violence and crime as chil-
dren mature into adolescents and adults.' Research also indicates
that the impact of violent programming varies according to the
nature and context of the programming. Children are more likely
to emulate violence if it is seen as realistic or perpetrated by a
hero. They are also more likely to be affected if the violence is re-
warded or left unpunished or if the negative outcomes of violence
are not shown.23
Researchers have recently developed a coding scheme for
violent programming based on these media effects. Under this
scheme, violent programming is defined according to the different
contexts in which violence is presented. The scheme incorporates
information on the perpetrator, action, and target of the violence
and codes for such elements as whether the violence is portrayed
in a realistic context or whether the violence is rewarded or pun-
ished. 4 Social science research on violent programming, which is
conducted largely in the laboratory, where aggressive behaviors
rather than criminal acts are observed, admittedly cannot pinpoint
the exact damage likely to be caused by a particular program.
However, the research does indicate generally which programs and
which types of acts within programs are more likely to be damag-
ing to children.
In fact, regulators frequently must-and do-take action with-
out knowing the precise nature of the externalities to be regulated.
21. See, e.g., David Waterman, "Narrowcasting" and "Broadcasting" on Nonbroadcast
Media: A Program Choice Model, 19 CoMM. RES. 3 (1992) (describing the relationship
between monetary investment in programming and viewership).
22. See supra note 17 for summaries of the impact of violent television programming.
23. Id. For an excellent precis of the importance of context in the presentation of
violence, see Dale Kunkel et al., Measuring Television Violence: The Importance of Con-
text, 39 J. BROADCASTING & ELEC. MEDIA 284-91 (1995).
24. Kunkel et al., supra note 23, at 288.
11851996]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
In the context of violent television programming, the uncertainty
surrounding the magnitude of damages implies neither that inac-
tion is the most desirable course nor that a regulatory response
entailing a total ban on such programming would improve net
social welfare. Although a ban (if held to be constitutional) might
eliminate the negative impacts on children arising from violent
programming, it would also lessen the viewing enjoyment of adults
who consume such programming. Therefore, the imprecise
quantification of harm in this area should prompt regulators to
pursue narrowly focused regulatory options that minimize the
impact on adult viewing options and that have a high degree of
probability of obtaining desired results. As described below, provi-
sion of information about programs might satisfy these criteria.
Information provision might also be an especially effective regula-
tory mechanism to use in an area such as television violence be-
cause its operation relies on individual choice rather than com-
mand and control measures.
III. INFORMATION AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT IN INFORMATION
MARKETS
Chairman Hundt has noted that the license renewal process
has devolved into a process of nearly automatic approval.' The
definitions of "public interest" standards are vague, leaving broad-
casters free to pursue a low-cost strategy of compliance that does
not significantly increase the probability that they will provide
programs with positive externalities. The Chairman has argued that
broadcasters should be required to satisfy certain clear public
interest standards as a condition for license renewal.26 For exam-
ple, in the area of children's educational programming, the Chair-
man has proposed a requirement of three hours per week for
licensed broadcast stations.' If requirements for broadcast licens-
es are in fact made more explicit, an additional way to ensure
compliance is to provide the public with a larger role in monitor-
ing contract performance.
Currently, viewers can participate in the license renewal pro-
cess by reviewing a broadcast station's public inspection file. Main-
tained at the station, the file contains a listing of public affairs
25. See Hundt, supra note 3, at 1094.
26. Id. at 1096.
27. Id. at 1110.
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issues the station is covering that are of concern to the communi-
ty, a listing of educational children's programs that the station
believes demonstrate compliance with the Children's Television
Act, data on political advertising sales, equal employment opportu-
nity information on workforce composition, and viewer complaints.
Additional information on station ownership and performance,
including a history of fines for regulatory violations, is maintained
at the FCC's Washington office.
The dispersion of information and the lack of a consistent
reporting format currently make it costly for viewers to determine
how a broadcast station is complying with the statutory public
interest standards. The FCC could remedy this by requiring sta-
tions to report information electronically to the agency, which
could in turn maintain an Internet-accessible database of station
information (including viewer complaints).2 Admittedly, the logic
of collective action suggests that the majority of viewers will never
use this data. However, local PTAs, national media organizations,
local journalists, and some viewers will use the information to
monitor station performance more closely. Consider the transfor-
mation of the debate over the provision of children's television
programming that would likely occur if such a database were avail-
able. Viewers or interest groups could determine how the provi-
sion of such programming varied within markets and across owner-
ship types. They could study the degree to which stations shirked
their public interest requirements by preempting educational pro-
grams and scheduling them for early morning hours. They could
also examine which programs were claimed to be educational, so
such programs could be studied for their content. Individuals could
also use data on children's programming to determine whether
stations which schedule low levels of educational programming for
children are also more likely to schedule their community service
programs at the earliest hours and to offer violent programming in
hours with large numbers of children in the viewing audience.
By lowering the transaction costs to viewers of monitoring
station performance, the FCC could increase the incentives for
broadcasters to comply with public interest requirements. Stations
will be less likely to claim that "Geraldo" or "Beverly Hills 90210"
28. See generally Comments of Professor James T. Hamilton, In re Policies and Rules
Concerning Children's Television Programming, MM Docket 93-48 (FCC 1995) (reviewing
programming policies).
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are educational for children if such claims are likely to be seen by
viewers.29 During the era of the New Deal, Justice Louis
Brandeis supported the provision of information to the public on
the grounds that "sunlight ... is the best of disinfectants."3 The
Internet offers the FCC the opportunity to extend this principle to
electronic reporting of station data. The future of digital broadcast-
ing may also provide the Commission with an opportunity to alter
incentives to comply with public interest standards. If part of the
spectrum continues to be allocated rather than auctioned, the
future ability of local stations to offer multiple programs at once
may give the FCC the chance to provide a credible sanction for
those who do not comply with public interest standards. At pres-
ent, although it can issue fines for violation of specific regulations,
the FCC's single major enforcement tool is license denial. License
denial is not a credible threat to broadcasters who fail to broad-
29. In 1992, the Center for Media Education released its Report on Station Compli-
ance with the Children's Television Act, which indicated that programs viewed by some as
more commercial than educational are often cited by stations as part of their compliance
with the CIA. See Edmund L. Andrews, Broadcasters, to Satisfy Law, Define Cartoons as
Education, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1992, at Al. Data from the public inspection files in
the Raleigh, North Carolina market demonstrate the types of claims made by some
broadcasters. In WLFL-TV 22, CHILDREN'S EDUCATIONALINFORMATIONAL PROGRAM-
MING REPORT (3d Quarter 1993), submitted by Gayle Hurd, Public Affairs Director, this
Fox affiliate station in the Raleigh market listed the following episodes of "Geraldo" as
educationallinstructional programming for children 16 and under:. Underaged and Over-
sexed; Overweight Kids and their Mothers; When Love Doesn't Make the Grade; Daugh-
ters in Distress; and Hooked Hollywood. The description of When Love Doesn't Make the
Grade states that: "This edition of Geraldo addresses teacher-student affairs. Information
on how parents can recognize the warning signs of this situation and the psychological
affects [sic] it can have on young, impressionable teenaged girls, and how to prevent it
from happening." In its 1992 programming report, WLFL-TV lists episodes of "Beverly
Hills 90210" as educational/instructional programming for children 16 and under. The de-
scription of the episode Beverly Hills 90210: Spring Dance/Beach Blanket Brandon states
that: "In this episode of 90210, the gang at West Beverly High goes to the prom after
which Brenda and Dylan confront the responsibilities and potential repercussions of hav-
ing sex. Although Brenda finds out she is not pregnant, the scare makes her think more
clearly about the issue of sex and causes her to want to slow things down with Dylan.
And Steve deals with the news that he's adopted." WLFL-TV 22, CHILDREN'S EDUCA-
TIONAIJINFORMATIONAL PROGRAMMING REPORT (3d Quarter 1992). For an examination
of the state of children's programming, see generally NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L.
LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND: CHILDREN, TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1995) (advocating improvements in children's telecommunications program-
ming).
30. Louis Brandeis wrote "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman." LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933).
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cast in the "public interest" because it is such a blunt instrument.
If the agency could deny a station part of its allotment of multiple
programming signals, however, the FCC would have additional
flexibility to penalize stations which failed to follow the public
interest terms of their licenses.
The V-chip, a television component capable of blocking televi-
sion programs based on ratings for violence or other objectionable
content, represents another way to use information as a regulatory
tool. Premium cable channels currently rate their programs, and
parents concerned about the content of the programming can
simply choose not to subscribe to these channels. Basic cable and
broadcast networks also have announced that they will provide on-
air advisories for violent programs. After a meeting with President
Clinton and Vice President Gore at the White House on February
29, 1996, representatives of broadcast networks, cable networks,
and production companies announced plans to develop a ratings
system for television programming (except for news and sports) to
be implemented by January 1997. 3'
Historically, however, broadcasters have been reluctant to rate
or place warnings on their programs. Their opposition to warnings
may be motivated in part by a fear that advertisers will avoid
programs with ratings for violence. Although the actual probability
that an individual consumer would boycott a company advertising
on programs labelled as violent is extremely low,32 companies
nonetheless may refuse to advertise during labelled programs to
avoid the association of their brand name with controversy.
Under the threat of legislative action on television violence,
broadcasters are labeling more programs as violent. From 1987 to
1993, only 2% of the 2,300 movies carried on prime time network
broadcast television had viewer discretion warnings. From May
through December 1995, on the other hand, nearly 14% of the
31. Mitchell, supra note 5.
32. In a 1993 Roper poll, 55% of those surveyed said that they had seen something
"personally offensive or morally objectionable" within the previous few weeks of televi-
sion viewing, but only 1% indicated that they had stopped buying a product advertised
on the program the last time they had been offended (45% reported that they simply
turned the channel). ROPER ORGANIZATION, INC., AMERICA'S WATCHING: PUBLIC ATTI-
TUDES TOWARD TELEVISION 26 (1993). These results are consistent with the logic of
collective action, according to which the small probability that an individual will lead a
company to change its advertising policy leaves most consumers reluctant to bear the
costs of switching brands, unless they gain ideological satisfaction from participation in
the boycott.
1996] 1189
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
prime time movies on broadcast network television carried viewer
discretion warnings.' Despite this increase, however, broadcast
networks still appear reluctant to label movies as violent, even if
viewers outside the network might feel that the movies merited
such a warning. A study of the 1994-95 television season by the
UCLA Center for Communication Policy found that broadcast net-
works failed to place advisories on particularly violent movies
shown in prime time.' Of 161 made-for-television movies or
miniseries examined in the study, the authors felt that twenty-three
raised concerns about violence25 Only two of these programs
were preceded by viewer warnings.36 Among the 118 theatrical
films shown by the broadcast networks during the 1994-95 season,
the UCLA viewers felt that fifty raised concerns about violence.37
The networks failed to place advisories on twenty-two of these
films.
3 8
If programs were rated and televisions had V-chips, the costs
to parents of monitoring the consumption of violent programming
would decline dramatically. Currently, parents must search for
information about program content, which often is not even listed
even in the daily television schedules provided in many newspa-
pers.3 The V-chip would lower the transaction costs to parents
by allowing them to determine the level of content appropriate for
their children and to set the V-chip accordingly. The lower costs
should lead more parents to screen programs, which would reduce
the externalities associated with the exposure of children to violent
programs while preserving the viewing options of adult consumers.
The question remains whether the provision of information
will actually work to reduce children's viewing of potentially harm-
ful violent programming. Two examples suggest that it will. First,
one type of information system, the Nielsen television ratings
33. See JAMES T. HAMILTON, DEwITr WALLACE CTR. FOR COMMUNICATIONS AND
JOURNALISM, MARKETING VIOLENCE: THE IMPACT OF LABELLING VIOLENT TELEVISION
CONTENT 13 (1995).
34. UCLA CENTER FOR COMMUNICATION POLICY, THE UCLA TELEVISION VIO-
LENCE MONITORING REPORT 65-69 (1995).
35. Id. at 64.
36. Id. at 71.
37. Id. at 77.
38. Id. at 87.
39. See Brooks Boliek, Markey Says Networks Renege on Violence Warnings, THE
BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 23, 1994, at 7H (discussing results of survey conducted by the
House Telecommunications Subcommittee staff of Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass.).
[Vol 45:1177
BROADCASTER INCENTIVES
system, already influences the scheduling of violent programs. Four
months each year (in February, May, July, and November) the
Nielsen company conducts viewer surveys in the more than 200
local television markets throughout the United States, in order to
develop the ratings data upon which local advertisers make their
commercial buys. The networks during these months schedule pro-
grams to increase local ratings, both because they own local sta-
tions and because they wish to increase the value of network affili-
ation. As part of this programming strategy, the networks schedule
a higher proportion of violent movies (for example, those that deal
with murder or family crimes, and especially those that focus on
true stories of murder or family crime) during the "sweeps"
months than during non-sweeps months.' In this way, informa-
tion collection and provision already directly affects the scheduling
of violent programming on the networks.
More direct evidence of the impact of information on
children's television viewing patterns comes from changes in the
Nielsen ratings of programs accompanied by parental discretion
warnings. From September 1987 through September 1993 the net-
work placed parental discretion warnings on approximately 2% of
the 2,300 films shown during prime time. Regression analysis of
ratings data reveals that, controlling for other factors such as show
times and movie genres, films that had viewer discretion warnings
lost .6 ratings points among children of ages two to eleven. This
translates into 222,000 fewer children in the audience for these
movies, a 14% drop in the average viewership of prime time mov-
ies by children.4' The viewer warnings did not have a statistically
significant impact on the ratings of teens or adults, indicating that
these viewers are neither lured nor deterred by parental discretion
warnings. Because these results are consistent with parents inter-
vening and screening their children's viewing options if they are
provided with information about program content, they suggest
that additional information provision mechanisms such as the V-
chip will be effective.
40. Approximately 2,300 movies shown from 1987 through 1993 on prime time
broadcast network television were analyzed by content, including violent content. For
those movies shown during sweeps months, there were (statistically significant) higher
proportions of movies during the sweeps months that dealt with murder, family crime,
true murder stories, and true family crime stories. See Hamilton, supra note 18.
41. See HAMILTON, supra note 33, at 13.
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CONCLUSION
In "The Public's Airwaves," Chairman Hundt outlines the
prospect for a new regulatory bargain with broadcasters. The areas
of concern he identifies-educational programming for children,
public affairs coverage, and indecent or violent programs-are all
characterized by market failures, although the magnitude of these
failures is unclear. In these program areas, broadcasters and view-
ers fail to incorporate the full costs and benefits to society in their
calculation of the private costs and benefits of programming and
viewing. Using the provision of information as a regulatory instru-
ment-through measures such as the V-chip--offers a policy based
on individual choice that is likely to reduce the externalities associ-
ated with violent programming. Although much of the debate
around the V-chip may center on whether it is consistent with the
First Amendment, theories of market failure and the calculus of
individual decisionmaking demonstrate that the information policy
embodied in the V-chip is consistent with the first principles of
economics.
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